HomeBreaking NewsTrustWallet Hack Explained: From Update to Wallet Drains worth $4M in $TWT,...

TrustWallet Hack Explained: From Update to Wallet Drains worth $4M in $TWT, BTC, ETH

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What Exactly Happened in the Trust Wallet Hack


Step 1: A New Browser Extension Update Was Released

A new update for the Trust Wallet browser extension was released on December 24.

  • The update seemed routine.
  • No major security warnings came with it.
  • Users installed it through the usual update process.

At this point, nothing seemed suspicious.


Step 2: New Code Was Added to the Extension

After the update, researchers looking into the extension’s files noticed changes in a JavaScript file known as 4482.js.

Key observation:

  • The new code was not in earlier versions.
  • It introduced network requests linked to user actions.

This matters because browser wallets are very sensitive environments; any new outgoing logic poses a high risk.


Step 3: Code Masqueraded as “Analytics”

The added logic appeared as analytics or telemetry code.

Specifically:

  • It looked like tracking logic used by common analytics SDKs.
  • It did not trigger all the time.
  • It activated only under certain conditions.

This design made it harder to detect during casual testing.


Step 4: Trigger Condition Importing a Seed Phrase

Community reverse-engineering suggests the logic was triggered when a user imported a seed phrase into the extension.

Why this is critical:

  • Importing a seed phrase gives the wallet full control.
  • This is a one-time, high-value moment.
  • Any malicious code only needs to act once.

Users who only used existing wallets may not have triggered this path.


Step 5: Wallet Data Was Sent Externally

When the trigger condition occurred, the code allegedly sent data to an external endpoint:

metrics-trustwallet[.]com

What raised alarms:

  • The domain looked a lot like a legitimate Trust Wallet subdomain.
  • It was registered only days earlier.
  • It was not publicly documented.
  • It later went offline.

At least, this confirms unexpected outgoing communication from the wallet extension.


Step 6: Attackers Acted Immediately

Shortly after seed phrase imports, users reported:

  • Wallets drained within minutes.
  • Multiple assets moved quickly.
  • No further user interaction was needed.

On-chain behavior showed:

  • Automated transaction patterns.
  • Multiple destination addresses.
  • No obvious phishing approval flow.

This suggests attackers already had enough access to sign transactions.


Step 7: Funds Were Consolidated Across Addresses

Stolen assets were routed through several attacker-controlled wallets.

Why this matters:

  • It suggests coordination or scripting.
  • It reduces reliance on a single address.
  • It matches behavior seen in organized exploits.

Estimates based on tracked addresses suggest millions of dollars moved, although totals vary.


Step 8: The Domain Went Dark

After attention increased:

  • The suspicious domain stopped responding.
  • No public explanation followed immediately.
  • Screenshots and cached evidence became crucial.

This is consistent with attackers destroying infrastructure once exposed.


Step 9: Official Acknowledgment Came Later

Trust Wallet later confirmed:

  • A security incident affected a specific version of the browser extension.
  • Mobile users were not affected.
  • Users should upgrade or disable the extension.

However, no full technical breakdown was given right away to explain:

  • Why the domain existed.
  • Whether seed phrases were exposed.
  • Whether this was an internal, third-party, or external issue.

This gap fueled ongoing speculation.


What Is Confirmed

  • A browser extension update introduced new outgoing behavior.
  • Users lost funds shortly after importing seed phrases.
  • The incident was limited to a specific version.
  • Trust Wallet acknowledged a security issue.

What Is Strongly Suspected

  • A supply-chain issue or malicious code injection.
  • Seed phrases or signing ability being exposed.
  • The analytics logic being misused or weaponized.

What Is Still Unknown

  • Whether the code was intentionally malicious or compromised upstream.
  • How many users were affected.
  • Whether any other data was taken.
  • Exact attribution of the attackers.

Why This Incident Matters

This was not typical phishing.

It highlights:

  • The danger of browser extensions.
  • The risk of blindly trusting updates.
  • How analytics code can be misused.
  • Why handling seed phrases is the most critical moment in wallet security.

Even a short-lived vulnerability can have serious consequences.

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